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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

CaseNo.20010384-CA

V.

Priority No. 15

DOUGLAS DOYLE DILLON,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for burglary and receiving stolen property in the
Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Iron County, State of Utah, the Honorable Robert T.
Braithwaite presiding. This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996 & Supp. 2001).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue 1: Did the trial court correctly deny defendant's motion to exclude his prior
conviction of attempted possession of stolen property?

1

Standard of Rev iew The trial court's ruling on a motion to exclude e\ idence of other
crimes is a legal question which this Court rev iew s for abuse of discretion. State v Decor so
1999 LT 57,«[ 18, 993 P.2d 837, cert denied, 528 U.S. 1164 (2000).
Issue 2. Did the trial court properly accept a stipulated jury instruction stating the
elements of the offense of receipt of stolen property?
Standard of Review: Because defendant stipulated 10 the jury instruction he now
challenges, any error is invited and cannot warrant be reversal. State v Chaney 1999 LT
App 309,«[ 54, 989 P.2d 1091.
Issue 3. Did the trial court properly rule that clothes provided to defendant were
appropriate and the fact that he is a flight nsk, has an erratic temperament and an extensive
criminal record required the he be partially restrained during trial?
Standard of Review: The trial court's ruling on questions of clothing and restraints
is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v Archuletta, 501 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 1972),
People v Henderson, 583 N.E.2d 1187, 1189 (111. App. 1991); see also State v Young, 853
P 2d 327, 350 (Utah 1993) (shackling defendant during penalty phase within trial court's
discretion).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are relevant to this appeal
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408
(1)
A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property of
another know ing that it has been stolen, or believ ing that it probably has been stolen, or w ho

conceals, sells, w ithholds or aids in concealing, selling, or vv ithholding the property from the
owner, knowing the property to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner of it.
(2)
The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is presumed in the case
of an actor who:
(a)
is found in possession or control of other property stolen on a separate
occasion;
(b)
has received other stolen property within the year preceding the receiving
offense charged; . . .
Utah R. Evid. 403.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantial^
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jur\,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.
Utah R. Evid. 404(b).
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.
It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. In other
words, evidence offered under this rule is admissible if it is relevant for a non-character
purpose and meets the requirements of Rules 402 and 403.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count of burglary of a building and one count of
receiving stolen property (R. 9-10). Defendant pleaded not guilty to both counts on February
7,2001 (R.17-18).
At the beginning of defendant's trial on March 23, 2001, he objected to being forced
to wear a dress shirt and tie, which were provided by the jail (R. 89:5). Defendant stated that
he vv ished to wear his own clothes which he claimed vanished after they were taken from his
truck by police (id.). Defendant also objected to being restrained during the trial (R 89 13)
3

The State requested that defendant be restrained because he was a flight risk, had exhibited
"erratic" behavior and has a long criminal history (id ).
The trial court ruled that the shirt and tie provided by the jail were appropriate (R
89* 12). The court also ruled that defendant needed to be restrained, but that he could have
one hand free to take notes (R. 89* 13).
At trial, defendant objected to the introduction of evidence concerning defendant's
involvement in other incidents involving stolen property (R. 8971). The State wanted to
introduce the fact that defendant had pleaded guilty to attempted possession of stolen
property in connection with other tools found in his truck which were reported stolen in
Millard County (R. 89*80-81). The State also wanted to introduce a pawn slip and swap meet
receipt found in defendant's truck (R.89:69).
Ultimately, the court allowed the state to introduce evidence of defendant's guilty plea
and the State withdrew its motion to admit the pawn slip and swap meet receipt (R 89 71,
78). The court reasoned that defendant's prior guilty plea to attempted possession of stolen
property was admissible because it was an element of the crime of receipt of stolen property
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (id).
Defendant was convicted on both counts and sentenced to two concurrent terms of 0-5
years in the Utah State Prison (R. 49-52).
Defendant timely appealed.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS1
Under defendant's version events, the fact that tools stolen from a work site ended up
in the back of his truck was pure happenstance. As a self-described "gambler," defendant
was en route from Cedar City, Utah, to Mesquite, Nevada, w hen he stopped at a convenience
store to get gas (R. 89:97). There, he came across two friends who offered to sell him an
assortment of tools, including a generator and numerous surveying instruments, for S 1.500
(R. 89:97-98). It was an offer defendant simply could not refuse, so he purchased the tools,
never suspecting that they were stolen (R. 89:100).
The next day, Thomas Braun, the owner of the tools, accompanied Iron County
Sheriff s Detective Mark Gower to the motel where defendant's truck was parked (R. 89:40).
Peering through the windows of the truck, Braun identified the tools as those stolen the night
before from his trailer at a work site (R. 89:41). Based on the information provided by
Braun, Gower obtained a search warrant and confiscated the tools, which Braun confirmed
were all of the items stolen from his trailer and some that were not (R. 89:41:49). Also
among the tools was a bent crowbar with paint markings that matched the color of the paint
on Braun's trailer (R. 89:52-53). The paint markings also matched the width of tool
scratches made during the burglary of the trailer (id.).

1

"On appeal, the facts are recited in a light most favorable to the juiVs verdict."
State v Bradley, 972 P.2d 78, 79 (Utah App. 1998) (internal quotations and citation
omitted).
:>

Not all of the tools belonged to Braun, however. Millard County deputies also
reviewed the items recovered from defendant's truck and determined that some of them w ere
reported stolen in that county (R:89:80-81). Defendant entered a guilty plea to charges of
attempted possession of stolen property with regard to the Millard County tools (R:89:71,
81).
Despite this evidence, defendant insisted that he had purchased the tools from the two
friends he met at the gas station, although he did not call them to testify and verify his story
(R. 89:105). He stated that after purchasing the tools, he continued to Mesquite w here he lost
most of his money and returned to Cedar City (R. 89:98).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I: Defendant's prior conviction of attempted possession of stolen property was
properly admitted at his trial. The tools found in the back of his truck included tools stolen
in Cedar City and in Millard County. Defendant pleaded guilty to the attempted possession
charge in Millard County. His conviction on the attempted possession charge created a
rebuttable presumption that he knew the other tools found in his truck, which he claimed he
purchased from his friends en route to Mesquite were also stolen. This presumption helped
establish the knowledge element of the crime of receiving stolen property under Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-408(2). For this reason, the evidence of the prior conviction was properly
admitted.
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Point II Although defendant now complains that thejury instruction concerning hib
prior conviction was inappropriate, he stipulated to the instruction at trial Moreover, the
instruction correctly states the law under Ltah Code Ann § 76-6-408 Accordingly, this
claim is without merit.
Point III Defendant's attire at trial consisted of a shirt and tie loaned to him by the
Iron County Correctional Facility These clothes were clean, pressed and professionallooking As a matter of law, no prejudice resulted from these clothes As for the restraints,
defendant failed at tnal to preserve the specific constitutional claims he now raises
Accordingly, those claims cannot be raised for the first time on appeal Moreover, the tnal
court acted out of legitimate concerns regarding defendant's cnminal record, his erratic
temperament and his being a flight nsk. Moreover, the court restrained only one of
defendant's hands, thus allowing him to take notes and hide the restraints under his table so
the jury could not see. Thus, there was no prejudice to defendant from his clothing or the
restraints.

7

AROLMENT
I.

DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CONVICTION FOR ATTEMPTED
POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY W\S ADMISSIBLE
BECAUSE IT ESTABLISHED AN ELEMENT OF THE
OFFENSE AT ISSUE IN THIS CASE.
A.

Defendant's Claims Concerning the Admission
of the Pawn Slip and the Swap Meet Receipt
are Erroneous.

Defendant spends several pages of his brief arguing that the tnal court should not hav e
admitted the pawn slip and swap meet receipt, State's Exhibits 13 and 14, which were
recovered from his truck Br Aplt at 7-14 However, the pawn slip and receipt were not
admitted.
The State intended to admit Exhibits 13 and 14 through the testimony of Detective
Gower, who had recovered the papers from defendant's truck (R. 89*54). However, before
Detective Gower could identify the exhibits, defendant's attorney objected (id)

The jury

was excused and the tnal court heard arguments from both parties concerning the
admissibility of the exhibits (R. 89:54-56, 70-71) Ultimately, the State opted not to move
for the admission of Exhibit 13 and 14 (R 89 71, see also R. 79) Thus, defendant's claims
concerning the supposed admission of the pawn slip and swap meet receipt have no basis in
the record.

8

B.

The Trial Court's Rulings Did Not Violate
Utah R. Evid. 403.

Defendant claims that the trial court's admission of "the evidence" was unfairK
prejudicial under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. Br. Aplt. at 14-15. Defendant is
mistaken.
First, it is unclear what "evidence" defendant is referring to. He states that the court
sustained defendant's objection to the "e\ ldence" twice before finally admitting it. Br Aplt
at 15. If defendant is referring to Exhibits 13 and 14, the court sustained defendant's
objection, but it is not true that the court reversed itself on that evidence (R.89'56).
However, as noted in section A. above, the State withdrew those exhibits and they were not
admitted (R. 89:71).
On the other hand, if the "evidence" to which defendant refers is the testimony
regarding his prior conviction for attempted possession of stolen property, its admission did
not violate rule 403. As the trial court noted, "not everything prejudicial should stay out. A
lot of times prejudicial evidence is very - fingerprints on a gun or something like that is
prejudicial, but, obviously, it comes in" (R. 89:115). Rather, the question to be decided
under rule 403 is whether the evidence is unfairly prejudicial. As the Utah Supreme Court
has stated:
"Since all effective evidence is prejudicial in the sense of being
damaging to the party against whom it is offered, prejudice
which calls for exclusion is given a more specialized meaning:
an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis,

9

commonly but not necessanlv an emotional one, such as bias,
sympathy, hatred, contempt, retribution or horror "
State v Uaurer, 770 P 2d 981, 984 (Ltah 1989) (quoting M Graham, Handbook of Federal
Exidence § 403 1, at 178 (2d ed 1986))

Defendant's prior conviction, although clearlv

damaging, does not arouse emotions of bias, sympathy, hatred, etc

Accordingly, the

evidence was properly admitted.
Moreover, defendant's prior conviction is also highly probative in that it establishes
an element of one of a crimes of which he stood accused Under Ltah Code Ann ^ "6-6408(2), it is presumed that a defendant knowingly received stolen property if he "is found
in possession or control of other property stolen on a separate occasion [or] has received
other stolen property within the year preceding the receiving offense charged, . . /"
Defendant's guilty plea to attempted possession of stolen property in Millard County
obviously meets the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(2).

Accordingly, the

evidence is highly probative and not "substantially outweighed" by its prejudicial effect.
Finally, defendant argues that the admission of the "evidence" after the court sustained
objections "on at least two (2) prior occasions" gave the evidence "a heightened sense of
importance" to jurors. Br. Aplt. at 15. "That is, it put the Appellant in an even worse light
than if the evidence had been admitted from the start" Id Once again, defendant is
mistaken. His argument presumes that the jury was present during arguments over the
admissibility of the evidence. In fact, jurors were properly excused by the trial court on each
of the three occasions when it considered the admissibility of the pawn slip, swap meet
10

receipt and defendant's prior conviction (R 89 56, "72-73, 78)

Because the argument*

concerning the admissibility of ev idence w ere appropriately held outside the jury's presence
defendant's claim of prejudice is baseless
C.

The Trial Court's Instruction Regarding the
Presumption Created by Defendant's Prior
Conviction Appropriately Cautioned Jurors
that he Must be Found Guilty Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt,

Defendant claims that the tnal court erred in instructing the jury that defendant s prior
conviction in Millard County created a rebuttable presumption that he knowingly received
stolen property in Cedar City Br Aplt at 16 "No part of this instruction attempts to caution
the jury to not find the Appellant guilty of this offense upon a belief that he was guilty of
offenses in another case " Id
As a preliminary matter, the contention must be rejected because defendant stipulated
to the instruction he now attacks as improper

Dunng a break in defendant's tnal, the

prosecutor and defense counsel discussed the instruction and presented the stipulated
instruction to the court, which accepted it (R 89 92) Because defendant stipulated to the
instruction in the tnal court, any error was invited error which cannot accrue to defendant b
benefit State v Chaney, 1999 UT App 309, « 54, 989 P 2d 1091 ("[A] party cannot take
ad\antage of an error committed at tnal when that party led the tnal court into committing
the error") (quoting State v Anderson, 929 P 2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996))
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Additionally, even assuming that the alleged error was preserved, defendant's claim
must still be rejected because Instructions 14 and 14a were entirely appropnate. The
instructions caution the jury that the presumption of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(2) does not
relieve the State of the burden of establishing defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubr
(R. 57-58). Instruction 14 reads in pertinent part:
Before you may find Defendant DOUGLAS DOYLE
DILLON guilty of the offense of Receiving Stolen Property as
charged in Count II of the Information, the state must prove and
you must find, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt. .
. [t]hat [defendant], while knowing that property had been
stolen, or believing that it probably had been stolen did
knowingly and intentionally receive, retain or dispose of the
property of another;. . .
Instruction 14a states:
The knowledge or belief that the property is stolen,
required by the Receiving Stolen Property Instruction, is
presumed in the case of an actor who is found in possession or
control of other property stolen on a separate occasion.
This presumption does not relieve the State from
proving every element of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. In speaking of the receiving or having possession of
other stolen property the fair interpretation includes "knowing
it to have been stolen." Knowing that the property is stolen is
what law condemns; and it should not be deemed to include
any innocent or unaware possession of stolen property.

:

The Utah Supreme Court has specifically held that the presumption created by
subparts (1) and (2) of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 are constitutional because a presumed
fact must be proven beyond a reasonable and '"the law regards the facts giving rise to the
presumption as evidence of the presumed fact/" State v Xhilhns, 549 P 2d 454 (Ltah
1976) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-503 (1999)); see also State v Plum, 552 P 2d 124
(Utah 1976).
12

While the presumed fact that the defendant was
possessing stolen propert> must be proved by the evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt, the law regards the facts giving rise
to the presumption as evidence of the presumed fact
(Emphasis added).
These two instructions demonstrate the care exercised by the trial court in instructing
thejury on the proper function of the presumptive knowledge provision of the statute Both
instructions stress that the State is required to prove each element of the offense bevond a
reasonable doubt and that the presumption that defendant knew the tools were stolen doeb
not relieve the State of its burden of proof The instruction also cautioned the jurors that
defendant's prior conviction is merely ''evidence of the presumed fact" that defendant knew
the tools were stolen, language which tracks the text of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-503 (1999)
explaining evidentiary presumptions.
Clearly, Instructions 14 and 14a were not erroneous because they are a correct
statement of the law. Accordingly, defendant's argument is without merit.
D.

Evidence of Defendant's Prior Conviction Was
Properly Admitted Pursuant to Rule 404(b) of
the Utah Rules of Evidence.

Defendant claims the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence ot
defendant's prior conviction dunng its case in chief Aplt Memo at 27 This contention
fails as a matter of law.
First, as noted above, defendant's prior conviction for attempted possession of stolen
property was admissible because it constituted an element of the offense of receipt of stolen
13

property under Ltah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(2). "Admission of prior bad acts is proper when
it tends to prove a contested material element of the crime charged." State v Morre

:

Q}

P.2d 292, 294 (Utah App. 1990). Thus, admission of the prior conviction was proper under
rule 404(b). Id.
Second, the evidence was properly admitted during the State's case in chief because
defendant's not guilty plea placed into contention every element of the cnmes of which he
was charged. As this Court has stated:
Because the prior bad act evidence at issue here related to
defendant's intent or knowledge, it was admissible in the State's
case in chief. By pleading not guilty, defendant placed all
elements of the crime at issue, including knowledge and intent.
State v. Widdison, 2000 UT App 185, % 33, 4 P.3d 100. Here, similarly, defendant's not
guilty plea placed at issue his knowledge of whether the tools were stolen. Thus, the
evidence was properly admitted.
II.

DEFENDANT WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY BEING
UNABLE TO WEAR HIS OWN CLOTHING OR BY
BEING RESTRAINED DURING HIS TRIAL.

Defendant suggests that he did not receive a fair trial because the court did not allow
him to wear his own clothes and required him to be partially restrained. These claims are
unpersuasive.
A defendant's appearance before a jury in prison or jail clothing is a per se violation
of his right to a fair trial, unless that defendant specifically waives his right to be tried in
civilian clothing. State v Bennett, 2000 UT 34, «ffl 3-4, 999 P.2d 1. However, a defendant's
14

appearance in street clothes does not violate his due process rights. See State \ AnhulethL
501 P 2d 263, 264 (Utah 1972) ("civilian shirt," a T-shirt, and denim overalls not
prejudicial). Here, defendant was clothed in a dress shirt and tie, an ensemble that the trial
judge deemed "casual," but still "at the top end of the scale" (R. 89:12)/ See Chess \ Smith.
617 P.2d 341, 345 (Utah 1980) (defendant not entitled to "expensive wardrobe", rather,
defendant should have "clean, respectable clothes, not identifiable as peculiarly prison
clothes"). As such, defendant's clothing was supenor to jail clothing or even to the shirt and
denim of the Archuletta defendant. Accordingly, defendant suffered no prejudice.
Restraining a defendant during trial present similar constitutional issues. "The sight
of shackles and gags might have a significant effect on the jury's feelings about the
defendant." Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970). However, restraints are sometimes
necessary when a defendant is a flight risk, has a history of violence or an erratic
temperament. See, e.g., People v. Henderson, 583 N.E.2d 1187, 1189 (111. App. 1991) If
a defendant requires restraint, the trial court should take measures to ensure that the restraints
are not apparent to jurors. See State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327 (Utah 1993) (trial court's efforts

Because the actual shirt has apparently not been preserved, or at least it is not part
of the record transmitted from the trial court, this Court should defer to the trial court's
characterization. See State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P 2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982), cert denied
460 U.S. 1044 (1983) (stating that when "a defendant predicates error to [an appellate
court], he has the duty and responsibility of supporting such allegation by an adequate
record;" an appellate court "simply cannot rule on a question which depends for its
existence upon alleged facts unsupported by the record ")
15

to minimize the effect of defendant's shackles by placing them beneath defendant's clothing
likely prevented prejudice).
Here, the prosecutor requested that the defendant be restrained because he "has an
extensive cnminal record," is a "flight risk" and "an erratic person" (R. 89*13). The
defendant objected obliquely, stating "I just object to the handcuffs" and requesting that his
hands be unrestrained during trial (id). As a compromise, the trial court opted to have only
one hand restrained so that defendant could take notes (id). Defendant made no further
objections.
Defendant's challenge to the use of restraints must be rejected

First, the

constitutional challenges defendant now raises were not preserved at tnal and, accordingly,
cannot be raised on appeal. As the Utah Supreme Court has stated:
A defendant cannot preserve issues for appeal by generally
objecting or nominally invoking the state and federal
constitutions
[A] 'contemporaneous objection or some form
of specific preservation of claims of error musl be made a part
of the tnal court record before an appellate court will review
such a claim on appeal.'
State v Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 460 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted) (emphasis added by
Alvarez court). At trial, defendant failed to state any basis for his objections to the handcuffs,
other than perhaps that they were inconvenient (R 89 13) Moreover, defendant voiced no
objection to the tnal court's compromise that he be allowed to keep one hand free (id)
Thus, defendant failed to preserve the constitutional claims he attempts to raise on appeal

16

Second, e\ en assuming that the issues w ere properly preserv ed the trial court properK
took steps to minimize both the inconv enience to defendant and the possibility of prejudicing
the jury by allowing defendant to keep one hand free so that he could take notes and,
presumably, prevent the jurors from seeing the restraints The court also made sure that
jurors were not in the courtroom when the defendant moved back and forth from the w itness
stand so that they would not see the restraints (R 89 6-7, 95) In addition, even if jurors did
glimpse defendant's restraints during the tnal, this would not necessarily "dilute the
presumption of innocence " See State v WetzeL 868 P 2d 64, 80 (Utah 1993) (citing L nited
States v Williams, 809 F 2d 75, 83 (1st Cir 1986), cert denied 481 U S 1030 (1987))
Defendant also appears to argue that his restraints prevented him from effectively
participating in tnal and assisting his attorney Br Apit. at 18-20 (citing People v Duratu
545 P 2d 1322, 1326 (Cal. 1976)). In effect, defendant seems to suggest that the restraints
violated his nght to be mentally present at his tnal Id at 19 However, defendant cites no
authonty for this "nght" and the State could find no case explicitly recognizing such a nght
See eg,

People v Jenkins, 997 P 2d 1044, 1116 (Cal. 2000) (no nght to be "mentally

present" at tnal) As the California Supreme Court stated "Even total physical absence from
a heanng is not reversible unless the defendant's presence bears a reasonably substantial
relation to the fullness of the defendant's opportunity to defend against the charges ' Id
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted) Additionally, the tnal court's decision to
allow defendant to keep one free hand "to write a note if he wants to" (R 80 13)
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demonstrates the tnal court's sensitivity to the issue and that it took measures to ensure
defendant could assist his attorney at tnal
Finally, even if the issues were properly preserved and the tnal court erred in requinng
restraints, any error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v California. 386
US. 18(1967) (upholding the application of harmless error analysis to federal constitutional
errors in state cnminal tnals). The Chapman court noted that harmless error rules
serve a very useful purpose insofar as they block setting aside
convictions for small errors or defects that have little, if any,
likelihood of having changed the result of the tnal. We conclude
that there may be some constitutional errors which in the setting
of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that
they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed
harmless, not requinng the automatic reversal of the conviction.
Id. at 22. However, before a constitutional error can be deemed harmless, it must be
determined that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v Thompson, 832
S.W.2d 577, 582 (Tenn.Cnm.App.1991) (shackling of defendant dunng tnal harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt).
Even assuming restraining defendant was error, the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. The evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming. See State v Peek.
2000 WL 565129, *22 (Tenn. Cnm. App) (no prejudice to defendant from shackles given
the strength of state's case and efforts taken to prevent jury from seeing shackles). The
stolen tools were found in his truck along with the crowbar used to pry open the trailer from
which the tools were stolen (R. 89:52-53). Moreover, defendant's w4ahbf - that he purchased
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the tools from friends at a gas station - actually inculpated him on the receiving stolen
property count because he admitted he received the tools under circumstances which
indicated they were stolen (R. 89:98, 105). Moreover, as already noted, the trial court took
measures to prevent the jury from seeing the restraints and defendant has not pointed to any
instances in which jurors could have seen them. Peek, 2000 WL at *22. Under these
circumstances, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that any error was harmless.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that defendant's conv iction
be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13th day of March, 2001.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General^

BRETT J. DELPORTO
Assistant Attorney General
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